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1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy  
Conceptualizing a New Institutional 
Framework for International Taxation 
Introduction 
While it may not always make the headlines of the popular press 
or be in the forefront of the news, the international tax regime is 
confronting a once-in-a-generation defining moment. For the first 
time in almost one hundred years, the countries of the world are 
seriously considering fundamental changes to the most basic 
structures underlying the taxation of international and cross-border 
activities. This volume of the Journal of Law & Policy, 
“Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International 
Taxation,” focuses on how and why the existing international tax 
order has begun to collapse and what issues can and should be 
considered in reconstructing a new institutional framework robust 
enough to address the needs of an increasingly global and digital 
economic world. 
When the United States first adopted its modern income tax in 
1913 following the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, international considerations were already at the fore. 
The problem confronting the United States was how to deal with U.S. 
taxpayers who were also paying tax to other jurisdictions. The 
concern was that if the United States imposed a tax in addition to that 
of the foreign country, the U.S. company would face a “double tax” 
that could discourage U.S. companies from doing business abroad. 
As the United States began to emerge as a global economic power, 
this was seen as a fundamental threat. To resolve this double tax 
problem, the United States faced three options: (1) negotiate with the 
other country over what the tax should be; (2) exempt income earned 
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by U.S. companies in foreign countries from U.S. tax; or (3) continue 
to tax income earned in foreign countries, but subtract any tax paid to 
the foreign country from the U.S. tax bill. 
After significant debate, both within the Unites States and 
internationally, the United States pursued both the first and third 
options. As a default, the United States would continue to tax the 
worldwide income of U.S. companies but would grant a credit for 
foreign taxes paid. In addition, the United States also pursued tax 
treaties with willing counterparty countries in which the countries 
would agree on how to divide the income of such taxpayers. Under 
the treaty system that emerged, each country agreed only to tax the 
income of a taxpayer from the other country if that taxpayer had a 
“permanent establishment” in the country. In this way, U.S. 
companies primarily based in the United States but doing business in 
treaty partner countries would not face double taxation. For business 
done in non-treaty partner countries, the double taxation would be 
offset by the foreign tax credit.  
This uneasy compromise—taxation credit-based regime for non-
treaty countries and a residence-based regime for treaty ones—
proved remarkably resilient. Recently, however, two threats to this 
order have arisen. First, individuals and some companies, with the 
assistance of foreign governments and banking institutions, have 
been found hiding assets offshore as a way to avoid reporting the 
income from such assets to their home country. Second, the rise of 
intellectual property and digital technology has begun to undermine 
the concept of “permanent establishment,” because these types of 
assets can easily be moved or located anywhere in the world. Paired 
with the increasingly global scope of business and the mobility of 
capital across borders, policing the old institutional order has begun 
to prove increasingly problematic, if not impossible. 
This breakdown has led to action on several fronts. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
began a project aimed at harmful tax competition with the intent of 
pressuring certain countries to adopt minimum standards of 
information sharing and tax cooperation. Many countries, led by the 
United States, added so-called “Limitation on Benefits” provisions to 
their treaties, denying treaty benefits to taxpayers unless they could 
demonstrate some objective economic connections with the country. 
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The United States unilaterally adopted the Foreign Account 
Transparency and Compliance Act (FATCA), which attempted to 
impose certain reporting requirements on foreign banks with U.S. 
depositors. Other multinational organizations, such as the G-20 and 
the United Nations, have also been involved, trying to incorporate the 
interests of a larger group of states, including those of developing or 
emerging economies, into the discussion. Most recently, the OECD 
has begun a study on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), 
attempting to generate a consensus on the issue of taxpayers shifting 
income around the world solely in search of lower taxes. The BEPS 
project resulted in an action plan that has called for many reforms 
among the members of the OECD.  
In many ways, the BEPS project, taken together with FATCA, 
Limitation on Benefits treaty clauses, and the Harmful Tax 
Competition project, demonstrates an unraveling of the modern 
international tax regime. In light of this unraveling, Washington 
University School of Law held a colloquium on “Conceptualizing a 
New Institutional Framework for International Taxation” on April 1, 
2013. Participants included Allison Christians, Associate Professor 
and H. Heward Stikeman Chair in Tax Law at McGill University; Itai 
Grinberg, Associate Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law 
Center; Michael Lennard, Chief of International Tax Cooperation and 
Trade at the United Nations Financing for Development Office; 
Diane M. Ring, Professor of Law at Boston College School of Law; 
and Lee Sheppard, Contributing Editor at Tax Analysts. This volume 
of the Journal of Law & Policy includes an edited transcript from that 
colloquium, which starkly demonstrates the breakdown of the 
international tax regime and the issues confronting the development 
of any new system from multiple different perspectives. In addition, 
this volume also contains three Essays on issues related to the topic. 
Taken together, these pieces represent a cross section of issues, 
concerns, proposals, and ideas related to the challenge of building a 
new institutional framework for the future of international taxation. 
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AVOIDANCE, EVASION, AND TAXPAYER MORALITY  
ALLISON CHRISTIANS 
Professor Christians directly addresses the question of how to 
draw the line between avoidance, which is legally permissible, and 
evasion, which is not. This problem has plagued tax law since the 
beginning, but has become of central importance to international tax 
law in light of the realities of the modern global economy. If 
taxpayers are free to play one country off of another, to exploit the 
rules of one legal regime to minimize tax in another, and to hide 
assets in one country from the eyes of other countries, the entire 
regime will necessarily fail. Yet any attempt to address this weakness 
has met with significant resistance, primarily because it is difficult if 
not impossible to achieve consensus on all of the details among the 
countries of the world. 
Professor Christians addresses this by examining the distinction 
between avoidance and evasion through the lens of soft law and 
morality. To the extent that morality can be used to draw this line, 
attempts by the OECD and others to prevent evasion through 
methods such as transparency become more likely to prove 
successful. In this manner, Professor Christians provides a theoretical 
tool which can be used to bridge the gap between the struggle to 
combat international tax evasion on the ground and the theoretical 
bases upon which to do so. 
TWILIGHT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS: 
HOW THE MULTINATIONALS SQUANDERED 
THEIR TAX PRIVILEGES 
LEE A. SHEPPARD 
In this Essay, Lee Sheppard confronts the difficult problems that 
arise in the transition from the old institutional framework to the new 
one. Sheppard clearly delineates the primary points of weakness in 
the institutional order and identifies where the important players in 
the process—individual states, the OECD, other multinational 
organizations, and, perhaps most importantly, the multinational 
corporations themselves—will attempt to have influence. As the old 
international consensus fades in light of the challenges presented by 
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the modern economy, the battle lines over who will win and who will 
lose in the emergence of a new consensus begin to emerge. 
Sheppard then applies this new framework to some of the most 
pressing issues plaguing the modern international tax regime—
intangibles, the digital economy, domestic political pressures, and 
international political pressures. Walking through each, the Essay 
demonstrates just how difficult it will be to reach consensus on any of 
these main points. The Essay then suggests that perhaps the only way 
to build a new consensus is to completely destroy the old one first, 
removing the vestiges of winners and losers under the existing regime 
so the relevant parties can focus on the challenges ahead. 
AN ANTIGUA GAMBLING MODEL  
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
ADAM H. ROSENZWEIG 
Professor Rosenzweig addresses the breakdown of the 
international tax regime from a different angle, by looking to the 
lessons that can be learned from other, successful international legal 
regimes. In particular, this Essay considers the recent—and so far 
only—example of the use of cross-retaliation in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), used by small states against large states for 
violations of their underlying agreements. In permitting cross-
retaliation, the WTO institutional structure recognizes that some 
small countries do not have sufficient economic or political power to 
negotiate a resolution of a conflict with larger countries. Instead, the 
WTO permits the smaller states to retaliate with respect to other 
agreements within the regime, so as to compensate the smaller states 
for the harm caused by violations undertaken by the larger ones. 
This Essay demonstrates how the WTO cross-retaliation regime 
operates by investigating the recent Antigua Gambling case in the 
WTO. In that dispute, the WTO held that the United States violated 
its obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services by 
banning offshore gambling websites, and, in response, the WTO 
permitted Antigua and Barbuda to retaliate by disregarding its 
obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of International Property 
agreement. The Essay then demonstrates how cross-retaliation can be 
a useful tool in overcoming disparate incentives between relatively 
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wealthier and relatively poorer countries, and proposes some ways in 
which a new international tax regime could adopt or implement 
cross-retaliation as part of any new institutional framework. 
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